php2shell: The Vulnerability Under Every PHP Application
Two critical bugs in the PHP engine itself, fixed in 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27 and 8.5.12. Your CMS version, your WAF and your vendor's silence are not controls. What is affected, how to check, and what to do first.
This page may be wrong, and it will go stale. Check the manufacturer’s, project’s or vendor’s own page before you act on it.
Published: 21 October 2026. Updated: 21 October 2026, evening. See Timeline below.
Every status below is a snapshot, not a vendor guarantee. This update re-read NCSC-NL’s revision
3b6535a(20:40 UTC: 650 packages, 31 Vulnerable, ten applications moved to Vulnerable in the runtime-scoped model), added the vendor pages published after 20:00 UTC, the CloudLinux/TuxCare package lists and the USN-8948-2 backports, and expanded the device tree; the chronology is in the Timeline below. This incident is moving fast: advisories, fixed versions and vendor statements are still changing, and some rows here will be wrong by the time you read them. Verify the version, the advisory and the fix against the manufacturer’s, project’s or vendor’s own webpage. Where a vendor has published nothing, that means the vendor has published nothing, not that the product is safe.
On , the PHP project shipped emergency releases for two vulnerabilities in the PHP engine, now known as php2shell. Not in WordPress. Not in Laravel. Not in a plugin, a theme, or a Composer package. In the interpreter that parses the request before any of those applications gets to run.
The two bugs are CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, both rated 9.2 under CVSS v4.0. Both are unauthenticated remote code execution. Both are reachable through the PHP request path itself. And both are fixed by a set of version numbers that most people will misread, because “we are on PHP 8.4” is not the same statement as “we are on 8.4.27 or later”.
This is the reference I wanted while reading the same-day advisories and trying to work out which of the boxes in front of me actually run PHP. It covers the mechanism, the version floors, the devices, the mitigations, and the myths that are already costing people time.
The short version
- Fixed: PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, 8.2.35. Anything below the floor for its branch is vulnerable.
- No upstream release: 8.1, 8.0 and 7.4. There are source-only minimal backports. Distributors and vendors have to carry them.
- Never fixed upstream: 7.3 and older. Some commercial support channels (Ubuntu ESM, TuxCare) now backport; check yours before declaring a host unfixable. The bug is present from 5.4 onward.
- Your CMS is not the bug. The runtime is. NCSC-NL now marks ten applications (WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, Laravel, Magento, MediaWiki, phpMyAdmin, Roundcube, Symfony, WHMCS) Vulnerable when they run on an affected PHP runtime. Patching the application still does nothing for php2shell.
- Restarting the workers is part of the fix. A package upgrade that leaves the old binary running in PHP-FPM or Apache has fixed nothing.
- If you cannot patch today: disable the memory limit, cap upload sizes, put a hard cgroup limit around the workers, turn off upload progress, and restart the workers. Those are stopgaps, not a fix.
What happened
The disclosure was coordinated and unusually compressed. PHP warned that emergency patches were coming on 20 October, published them at 13:30 UTC on the 21st, and the ecosystem followed within hours: USN-8948-1 from Ubuntu, DSA-6574-1 and DLA-4848-1 from Debian, RHSA-2026:87072 from Red Hat. CERT-EU published advisory 2026-018, and national CERTs from France, Germany, Poland, Slovakia, the Netherlands and Singapore followed with their own alerts.
The credit line is Calif.io, Wiz, OpenAI and Quarkslab, with the discovery described as AI-assisted. Public write-ups and a tool called PHP2Shell circulated at the same time as the patches. Demonstrations claimed code execution against current releases of WordPress, MediaWiki, phpBB, Magento, Joomla, Laravel, Symfony, Drupal and WHMCS. Cloudflare’s CTO reported early exploitation, and Cloudflare, Akamai and Imperva shipped emergency WAF rules within hours.
As of the evening of 21 October there was no CISA KEV entry for either CVE. Do not read that as reassurance. KEV lag is a well-documented feature of the catalogue, and the exploitation reports were already public.
One more piece of context, reported by The Next Web: PHP knew about one of the two flaws in 2024, and a fix could not be agreed. I cannot independently verify the internal history, but it fits the shape of the bug: both issues live in the part of the engine that everyone depends on and nobody wants to rewrite.
The application tier moved
The first version of this page said the CMS tier was irrelevant. The mechanism claim has not changed, but the authoritative inventory now uses different language. At 20:40 UTC, NCSC-NL revision 3b6535a moved ten applications from Investigation to Vulnerable, runtime-scoped: Drupal, Joomla 6.x, Laravel 13, Magento Open Source, MediaWiki, phpMyAdmin, Roundcube Webmail, Symfony, WHMCS and WordPress. The VEX records the assessed element as the PHP runtime, not the application code, and the wording says Calif confirmed representative application-level pre-auth RCE.
That is not a contradiction. A WordPress install on a patched PHP runtime is not exposed to php2shell, regardless of its WordPress version. A WordPress install on an unpatched runtime is exposed, regardless of its WordPress version. WordPress’s own security post says to update PHP and points at Tools > Site Health > Info > Server; Drupal issued a PSA on 20 October telling admins to update PHP. The ten match the confirmed default-configuration demonstrations published by Precursor Security, which also names Nextcloud.
The tree does not relabel these products Vulnerable: the application rows stay under PHP app, and the Laravel and Symfony frameworks stay under Caller-side, because the application code is not the vulnerability. The inventory’s own security_assessedElement is the runtime. If you run any of the ten, the action is the same: patch PHP and restart the workers. Do not close the ticket because the CMS is current.
Timeline
- October 20, 2026: PHP gave advance notice of an emergency release for 21 October at 14:00 UTC, covering two critical vulnerabilities, without naming the CVEs.
- October 20, 2026: watchTowr confirmed the rumored flaws were real and said it had reproduced both. BleepingComputer reported the advance notice and the CVE identifiers.
- October 21, 2026, 13:30 UTC: PHP published the advisories and released 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35. The release had been pulled forward from 22 October after details leaked.
- October 21, 2026: Ubuntu, Debian and Red Hat shipped fixed packages. CERT-EU, CERT-FR, BSI, CERT Polska, SK-CERT, NCSC-NL, CSA Singapore and RUS-CERT published alerts, and the UK NCSC urged organisations to update immediately or take systems offline.
- October 21, 2026: Exploitation reports arrived from Cloudflare, watchTowr and Sansec, while demonstrations claimed code execution against WordPress, Drupal, Joomla, Magento, Laravel, Symfony and others. No CISA KEV entry existed that evening; CISA said it had not observed exploitation, while watchTowr rated both flaws 10.0 against PHP’s 9.2.
- October 21, 2026, 19:51 UTC: WatchGuard published
WGSA-2026-0032: an initial assessment that none of its products are affected, under continuing review. It is the first network-security appliance vendor to publish a product position. - October 21, 2026, by 20:00 UTC: Palo Alto had published a PAN-OS and Panorama advisory with no fixed version and no ETA, a product-specific CVSS of 8.7 and IPS signatures 543004 and 97622-97625. Microsoft published Azure Front Door rule 99006001, disabled by default and rolling out to 28 October, plus an App Gateway header-rewrite workaround. Google published GCP-2026-070, which auto-patches only when automatic updates are enabled.
- October 21, 2026, by 20:00 UTC: Sophos had said no products are affected but took its legacy MyUTM hosted licensing portal offline because it ran affected PHP. cPanel and Plesk published patched-version matrices; Plesk rebuilt its EOL branches with the same version numbers and a new build date. A firmware analysis found PHP 8.1.34 unpatched in the Citrix NetScaler management GUI, while the Gateway and AAA data plane have PHP off. Red Hat rated the CVE Important rather than Critical.
- October 21, 2026, 20:19 UTC: GoDaddy said managed WordPress is patched but shared Web and Windows hosting are mitigated and waiting on vendor packages. SiteGround said it disabled the affected functionality before release. Vercel said it had advance notice and deployed WAF rules before disclosure. CloudLinux and TuxCare published package-level fixes, including fixed alt-php 5.2 and 5.6, and Ubuntu published USN-8948-2 for 14.04 through 20.04.
- October 21, 2026, 20:40 UTC: NCSC-NL published revision
3b6535a(650 packages, 31 Vulnerable). Ten applications moved to Vulnerable, runtime-scoped: Drupal, Joomla 6.x, Laravel 13, Magento Open Source, MediaWiki, phpMyAdmin, Roundcube, Symfony, WHMCS and WordPress. PHP core was split into an affected-scope row and a fixed row; the VEX now names the PHP runtime as the assessed element. - October 21, 2026, evening: The “no fix for 7.3 and older” line was corrected and widened. No upstream fix exists, but Ubuntu ESM and TuxCare published backports down to PHP 5.5.9, and CloudLinux is shipping fixed alt-php 5.2 and 5.6 packages. Ubuntu’s 14.04 to 20.04 fixes are USN-8948-2. On CloudLinux, use
yum update alt-php*;yum --securitywill not list the packages until the OVAL/VEX metadata is published. - October 21, 2026, evening: The reaction was larger than first reported: Finland, the Netherlands, France, Denmark, Edinburgh, several BBC programme sites and Wikimedia took systems offline. Japan’s prime minister urged operators to check for PHP, and the NSA advised taking systems offline if they could not be patched.
- October 21, 2026, evening: This page added WatchGuard, GoDaddy’s managed/shared split, SiteGround, Laravel Forge and the phpMyAdmin family; moved Nextcloud AIO to Patched; and updated the PAN-OS, Plesk, cPanel, Citrix, CloudLinux, TuxCare, Heroku and GLPI rows with the vendor pages above.
- October 21, 2026, evening: What did not change: no second patch round, the fixed versions remain 8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35, and CISA KEV still has no entry. WatchGuard and Palo Alto are the first appliance vendors to publish; Synology, QNAP, Netgate, Deciso, Fortinet, Juniper, F5 and Citrix still have no php2shell advisory.
The two bugs
The advisories describe two different failures in the same request lifecycle. They are worth understanding separately, because the mitigations for one do not automatically cover the other.
CVE-2026-109618: the out-of-memory cleanup path
PHP enforces memory_limit by unwinding the request with longjmp(). That is a hard, non-local jump out of whatever the engine was doing, and the cleanup code that runs afterwards has to decide what is safe to free.
If the limit is hit while request data is only partly initialised, which is exactly the state you are in halfway through parsing a multipart upload, that cleanup can treat attacker-influenced uninitialised memory as a valid structure. It then frees it, or branches on it, and the result is memory corruption in the middle of a privileged process. The advisory’s phrase is “OOM corruption”; the practical translation is that a request designed to exhaust memory at the wrong moment can turn a controlled failure into code execution.
This is why the upload path matters even if your application never processes an upload. PHP parses the request body before your code runs.
CVE-2026-109619: stale state on a reused worker
The second bug is the one that should worry anyone running PHP-FPM. A long-running worker handles many requests, one after another. PHP resets per-request state between them, and the reset assumes the previous request’s memory is either still valid or cleanly gone.
After certain fatal errors, some per-request globals can survive after their backing memory has been freed. The next request on that worker reaches the stale state before normal initialisation has replaced it. The advisory describes the result as code execution through state that belongs to a request that has already ended.
That is a cross-request bug, not just a single-request bug. On shared hosting, the next request on the worker is not necessarily yours.
Wiz’s write-up, published with the patch, groups four distinct bugs under the two CVEs: the upload-progress unserializer use-after-free (109618), and a fatal-error backtrace use-after-free plus an OPcache type confusion (both 109619). Two consequences follow.
First, the session.upload_progress mitigation is aimed at one specific path, which is exactly why PHP calls these mitigations incomplete rather than a fix.
Second, memory disclosure is a finding in its own right. Wiz demonstrated reading passwords, tokens and API keys out of a PHP worker’s memory without achieving code execution. If you ran unpatched PHP anywhere reachable, patching does not un-leak what was already readable: rotate the secrets those workers could see.
Why “pre-auth” does not mean “one packet and you are done”
Both CVEs are unauthenticated. There is no login, no session, and no application-level permission in the path. That is the part that makes them critical.
The CVSS vector also says AC:H and AT:P:
AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Attack complexity is high and attack requirements are present. In practice that reflects preconditions: a particular memory limit, a body size that lands in the right window, a worker that can be made to reuse state, a SAPI whose lifecycle exposes the stale globals. Reliability varies by SAPI, by memory_limit, by post_max_size and by worker model. Sansec and watchTowr reported successful reproduction; at least one independent researcher documented reaching the vulnerable path without completing the chain.
So the honest position is: expect exploitation to be uneven, but do not treat “I could not reproduce it in ten minutes” as evidence of safety. One request can be enough. A busy server makes the second bug easier, because the next request lands on the same worker sooner.
Two vendor positions are worth keeping separate. Red Hat rates the flaw Important, not Critical, arguing that RHEL’s default PHP-FPM workers exit on early initialization failures and that reliable exploitation needs precise heap manipulation. That is one vendor’s risk assessment, not a reason to delay, and mod_php remains the highest-risk SAPI. SentinelOne says no verified, reliable end-to-end public exploit exists; public PoC code and successful reproductions do. The disputed term is reliability, not existence.
The version floors
There is no single fixed version. There is a floor per branch, and a branch that is past end of life has no upstream floor at all.
| Branch | Fixed at | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 8.5 | 8.5.12 | Current stable |
| 8.4 | 8.4.27 | Debian 13, Docker 8.4, many appliances |
| 8.3 | 8.3.36 | Ubuntu 24.04, pfSense 2.8, cPanel ea-php83 |
| 8.2 | 8.2.35 | Debian 12, RHEL 9 module, QNAP 5.1 |
| 8.1 | no upstream release | Source-only backport. Ubuntu 22.04 ships 8.1.2-1ubuntu2.28 |
| 8.0 | no upstream release | Source-only backport. Synology 8.0 is stuck at 8.0.30 |
| 7.4 | no upstream release | Source-only backport; cPanel ea-php74 carries one |
| 7.3 and older | no upstream release | Replace or isolate, but check your support channel: Ubuntu ESM fixes 5.5.9 on 14.04, and TuxCare ELS ships per-platform packages. “Old” is not automatically “unfixable” |
Two reading errors are already common. The first is comparing a vendor’s version string to “8.4” instead of “8.4.27”. The second is assuming that a vendor backport is the same as an upstream release; Ubuntu’s 8.1 package is a backport, and its version number will never look like 8.1.x upstream because 8.1 has no upstream release.
If you take one number away from this post, take the floor for the branch you actually run, not the newest number in the announcement.
Patching the application does nothing
The most expensive misunderstanding is that this is a CMS vulnerability. It is not.
A PHP web request goes through layers in a fixed order. The web server hands the request to a SAPI. The SAPI parses the request body, populates superglobals, sets up the execution environment. Only then does it compile and run your index.php. Frameworks, CMS bootstrap code, middleware and plugins all run after that. php2shell lives in the layer that runs first.
That has three consequences:
- A fully patched WordPress on an unpatched PHP-FPM worker is vulnerable.
- A “Hello World”
index.phpis just as exposed as a Magento storefront. - A WAF rule, a framework middleware or an application-level upload allowlist is downstream of the bug, not upstream of it.
The same logic explains why updating Composer, PHPUnit, Symfony or your payment SDK changes nothing. They are PHP code. The interpreter is the target.
NCSC-NL now marks ten applications Vulnerable in a runtime-scoped model, but that does not move the fix into the application: the inventory’s assessed element is the PHP runtime. The tree keeps them under PHP app for the same reason.
What is actually running PHP
The public inventory from NCSC-NL and CERT-EU listed 633 PHP-dependent components from 431 suppliers when this post was first published, and 648 from 432 suppliers after the 19:30 UTC regeneration, with 36 rows changing status in three hours. Most were still under investigation. That list is a floor, not a ceiling: it only counts products somebody had already catalogued, and it says nothing about the PHP runtime buried inside an appliance whose vendor never mentions PHP in the datasheet.
So I built the tree below from the vendor advisories, the distribution notices, the appliance documentation and the firmware evidence in the project this post came from. It has more than 650 entries across 16 branches: runtimes and distributions, hosting and containers, control panels, CMS and business applications, operations tools, storage, network gear, enterprise appliances, printers, telephony, IoT, OT, developer tooling, and the data-centre hardware that was checked and cleared.
Every row carries an evidence grade, not just a guess:
- Vulnerable means the vendor confirmed it, or the product is on a branch with no fixed build available.
- Likely means PHP is in the request path and the shipped build is below the floor.
- No fix means end of life, or the vendor has said no patch will come.
- PHP app means the product is written in PHP and inherits whatever runtime it sits on. Its own version is not a control.
- Patched means a fixed build is published and acknowledged.
- No PHP means the management path was checked and has no interpreter.
- Verify means PHP may be present but the public evidence does not settle it. Treat it as a task, not a verdict.
Search by vendor, product, device class or status. The status chips filter the whole tree. The search box matches names, vendors and notes, so “QNAP”, “printer” and “mod_php” all work.
PHP runtime and SAPIs17
php2shell is a bug in the PHP engine, not in an application. Every SAPI that embeds the vulnerable engine is a way in, and the fix is a specific version floor per branch.
Release branches8
The fix floor is per branch. Comparing a vendor's version to a single number is how people conclude they are patched when they are not.
No upstream release. Distributors must backport the source fix or you rebuild it yourself.
No upstream release. Backport only.
No upstream release. Source-only patch; vendors must carry it.
Never fixed. The bug is present from 5.4 onward and no release will close it.
Server APIs6
Every SAPI is in scope. A CGI-only appliance that nobody has touched since 2016 is not safer; it is just older.
The common nginx/ Apache replacement. One process serves many requests, so the second bug crosses request boundaries.
Highest risk of the family: the interpreter lives inside the long-running httpd worker, so stale globals are reachable from the next request on that worker.
Still shipped by appliances that never moved to FPM.
LiteSpeed's bundled PHP builds track upstream, so the same floors apply.
Static builds were named as confirmed vulnerable in the disclosure.
Any application that links libphp inherits the engine bug.
Builds and packaging3
Official Windows builds stopped in November 2022, so every Windows PHP install is permanently behind unless somebody else maintains it.
Static binaries embed the engine version they were built against.
Patched builds exist for the current releases of the major distributions. The Operating systems branch below has the per-distro detail.
Operating systems and Linux distributions31
The distro is where most people actually get PHP. The question is not whether the distro knows about php2shell, it is whether the package you have installed is above the branch floor.
Linux28
The pattern to watch for: an LTS distro that ships an old branch, an ESM paywall in front of the backport, and a third-party PPA that everyone treats as the vendor.
USN-8948-1, published 21 October 2026.
USN-8948-1 covers the 8.1 package set.
USN-8948-2: php7.4 7.4.3-4ubuntu2.29+esm5 via Ubuntu Pro/ESM. Restart Apache or the FPM pool.
USN-8948-2: php7.2 7.2.24-0ubuntu0.18.04.17+esm14 via Ubuntu Pro/ESM. Restart the pool.
USN-8948-2: php7.0 7.0.33-0ubuntu0.16.04.16+esm22 via Ubuntu Pro/ESM. Restart the pool.
USN-8948-2: php5 5.5.9+dfsg-1ubuntu4.29+esm18 via Ubuntu Pro/ESM. "Old PHP" is not automatically unfixable: a PHP 5.5 build now has a vendor fix. Restart the pool.
DSA-6574-1, php8.4 8.4.27-1~deb13u1.
DLA-4848-1, php8.2 8.2.35-1~deb12u1.
7.4 is LTS-only. Check whether the LTS team has issued a backport.
RHSA-2026:87072 covers the php:8.2 module stream. The base PHP AppStream is a separate, still-Vulnerable row below.
NCSC-NL lists the base RHEL 9 PHP AppStream package as Vulnerable while the php:8.2 module is fixed. Check which one you run; RHSA-2026:87072 covers the module, not the base stream. Red Hat rates the CVE Important rather than Critical, arguing FPM workers exit on early initialization failures; that is a vendor risk position, not a reason to leave mod_php exposed. Advisory
Check the current errata for the php:8.3 stream; do not infer from RHEL 9.
Both streams are past upstream support. Confirm whether Red Hat is carrying a backport.
Rebuilds the RHEL 9 errata, including RHSA-2026:87072.
Follows the RHEL 9 errata stream.
Oracle ships its own errata; check the php:8.2 module version rather than assuming.
SUSE had the php8 update in progress at publication.
SUSE stated no fix is planned for the php7 package.
SUSE marked these not affected in its statement.
php83 and php84 packages exist. Check `apk info -v php*` for the branch floor.
Check the ALAS advisory for the php8.2/8.3 package.
php7.4/8.0 on an OS past end of life.
Rolling release; update to the current php package.
Rolling release. The current package is above the floor.
Rolling release; rebuild after syncing.
Check the channel's php derivation version.
lang/php8x port version decides it.
Check the php-8.x package revision.
Windows and macOS3
IIS ships no PHP. If you are not running PHP-FPM or mod_php on it, there is nothing to patch.
Removed from macOS in version 12. Nothing is bundled to patch.
Update the formula; check `php -v` afterwards.
Hosting, cloud and container images47
Managed platforms own the runtime, so the only useful question is what they will tell you. Self-managed images are your problem, including every tag you pinned last year.
Managed platforms25
Shared hosting is the hardest case to audit: you can read the PHP version, but not always the patch level, and never the worker lifecycle.
Vendor-managed. Automattic says WordPress.com, WordPress VIP, WP Cloud, Pressable and Tumblr were already protected; the customer has no runtime to touch. Advisory
Vendor-managed. Ask for the PHP version and patch time on your environment.
Vendor-managed. MyKinsta exposes the PHP version per site.
Vendor-managed. Check the upstream version in the dashboard.
Vendor-managed Drupal platform.
You pick the PHP version in the config, so the version is visible to you.
Vendor-managed, but the build image version is part of the deploy.
Heroku rebuilt PHP 8.1.34 on Heroku-22 with a backported fix and published 8.2.35/8.3.36/8.4.27/8.5.12. Redeploy the app to pick up the runtime; a buildpack app is not patched until it is rebuilt. Advisory
Native PHP runtime pinned per service.
You supply the image, so you supply the patch.
Nixpacks or a Dockerfile; the PHP version is in your build.
Buildpack PHP version is selectable and visible.
Platform version pins the runtime. Rebuild after the platform update.
Named as confirmed vulnerable: the published runtime layers and images carry the old engine.
Vendor-managed image, but the runtime is inside your worker. Check via Kudu or SSH. Microsoft's Azure WAF guidance is separate: Front Door rule 99006001 is disabled by default and App Gateway has only a header-rewrite workaround; upgrade the runtime. Advisory
NCSC-NL lists the Standard runtime as fixed. Google's GCP-2026-070 says some App Engine and Cloud Run workloads are auto-patched only when automatic updates are enabled; redeploy to be sure. Advisory
NCSC-NL lists the Flexible runtime as Vulnerable. Google's GCP-2026-070 says automatic updates must be enabled for the platform to patch it; otherwise rebuild the custom runtime, or move to Standard. Advisory
Shared host. Ask support, then verify from the shell if you have one.
Shared host. The PHP version is selectable per domain.
Shared host. Version is visible in the control panel.
Shared host. Version is selectable, but the patch level is not.
GoDaddy says all PHP versions on its managed WordPress tier are patched (21 October, 19:30 UTC). Advisory
GoDaddy says mitigations are in place and the runtime fix is waiting on vendor packages. Ask whether PHP itself is patched, not whether the site is protected; VPS owners patch themselves. Advisory
SiteGround disabled the affected functionality before the release. That is a feature-level mitigation, not a confirmed runtime patch; ask when PHP was updated to the branch floor. Advisory
Forge's automatic updates do not patch PHP: it installs PHP from its own repository, and only Ubuntu's own security repository is covered by unattended upgrades. Update each server and restart FPM. Advisory
Containers, stacks and local dev13
Rebuilt above the branch floors. Pull the tag again; a cached local image is not patched.
A tag such as php:8.2-fpm pinned by digest stays vulnerable forever. Re-resolve it.
Vendor images are frozen at build time. Check the build date, not the version label.
Wraps the official image, so the tag you pinned decides it.
`ddev debug php-version`; update the DDEV binary to move the image.
Community images; check the PHP image tag.
Bundles its own PHP. Only the 2026 builds can be above the floor.
Bundled PHP; check the MAMP release date.
Bundled PHP; check the installer version.
Bundled PHP; the full installer is older than the fix.
Project dormant; the bundled engine is years old.
Ships a managed PHP build; update Herd itself.
Ships managed runtimes; update the app.
Serverless and edge9
No PHP runtime. The WAF rules are a separate control, not a fix.
Vercel Functions can run PHP, and Vercel says its WAF rules cover PHP functions and proxied backends; static and edge deployments have no PHP. Vercel received advance notice and deployed the rules before disclosure, but direct-to-origin requests bypass the edge. Confirm the function runtime. Advisory
Static and Node/Go functions; no PHP.
Static hosting.
V8 isolates, not PHP.
Wasm at the edge, no PHP runtime. Fastly's php2shell WAF is a stopgap: it may block legitimate traffic, and direct-to-origin requests bypass it. Advisory
You build the container; the runtime is your image. The inventory labels the customer PHP container option Vulnerable, so a base-image bump and rebuild is on you. GCP-2026-070 says automatic updates must be enabled; a pinned image is not auto-patched. Advisory
You build the container.
Whatever image you schedule is what runs.
Control panels and server management25
Panels bundle PHP, patch it on their own schedule, and usually run as root. They are the highest-leverage single fix on a typical VPS.
Hosting panels21
Fixed in cPanel 11.110.0.153 / 11.134.0.66 / 11.136.0.50 / 11.138.0.18 and EasyApache 4 25.91. ea-php 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1 now have backports as well as 8.2-8.5. Verify with `rpm -q --changelog`, not `php -v`; branches older than 7.4 are not covered. Advisory
Hosted-site PHP 8.2-8.5 is patched; 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1 were rebuilt with the same version number, so check the build date (21 October 2026). The panel's sw-engine is still unpatched until hotfix 18.0.80#11 / 18.0.81#4; restrict or stop sw-cp-server until then. Advisory
Hosted PHP 8.2-8.5 is patched; the EOL rows are not listed as patched, and the panel's sw-engine is waiting on the same hotfix as Linux. Windows does not save it, because Plesk ships the runtime. Advisory
CustomBuild hosted PHP is fixed in the 21 October inventory update. Rebuild php-fpm.
NCSC-NL lists the ISPConfig 3 panel UI and scripts as Vulnerable: the panel's own PHP is in the request path.
Perl panel, but it manages PHP-FPM pools that still need patching.
Manages per-domain PHP-FPM; the packages come from the distro.
The hosted-site PHP-FPM/MultiPHP option is fixed; rebuild the pool.
Separate row, separate status: the panel's own hestia-php runtime is listed Vulnerable.
Hosted PHP and CLI selection are fixed. Rebuild every compiled version.
LiteSpeed-based; LSPHP builds need updating.
Panel is PHP; the customer PHP versions come from the distro.
Fixed alt-php packages are rolling out: 5.2, 5.6, 7.4, 8.0 and 8.4 across CloudLinux 6/7, AlmaLinux 8-10, Ubuntu 18.04-26.04 and Debian 10-13; 8.5 was scheduled for around 22:30 UTC. The inventory still lists the selector Vulnerable at 20:40 because the rollout is incomplete. Use `yum update alt-php*`, not `yum --security`, because the OVAL/VEX metadata is not published yet. Advisory
Legacy extended-support packages are still Vulnerable in the 20:40 inventory while the Alt-PHP 5.2/5.6/7.4/8.0/8.4 fixed sets roll out. Check the exact package and branch. Advisory
Fixes are published for RHEL 7, Oracle Linux 6/7, CentOS 8.4/8.5 and Stream 8, Amazon Linux 2, AlmaLinux 9.2/9.8 ESU, TuxCare 9.6/9.8, Ubuntu 16.04/18.04/20.04 ELS and Alpine 3.18 ELS. CentOS 6/7, Debian 10 ELS and PHP for Windows were still pending; the Windows ELS row was withdrawn. Advisory
The umbrella ELS row remains Vulnerable in the 20:40 inventory even though the per-platform packages above are fixed. Check the exact package, not the family name, and do not rely on `yum --security` until the OVAL/VEX metadata is published. Advisory
Dozens of PHP appliances. Each one needs its own check.
Manages the stack on your server; you still own the package update.
Same model: managed configuration, your packages.
Managed WordPress stack on your VPS.
Managed configuration on your VPS.
Legacy panels with their own bundles4
Abandoned upstream; the bundled PHP is old.
Bundles multiple PHP versions; each needs a rebuild.
Python panel; manages PHP-FPM pools.
Bundled PHP builds, vendor update required.
CMS, forums and publishing72
The most common bad reflex after a PHP runtime bug is to patch the CMS. These are all PHP applications: their version number says nothing about whether the interpreter underneath them is fixed. NCSC-NL's 3b6535a revision marks ten of them Vulnerable in a runtime-scoped VEX: the application is affected when it sits on an affected PHP runtime, not because its own code contains the bug.
Content management29
All of these need the same thing: a patched interpreter. The CMS version is not a control for php2shell.
Core is PHP. NCSC-NL's 3b6535a revision marks WordPress Vulnerable when it runs on an affected PHP runtime, and WordPress's own advisory says to update PHP, not the CMS. A current WordPress on an unpatched FPM worker is still exposed. Advisory
PHP + Symfony. NCSC-NL marks Drupal Vulnerable in the runtime-scoped app tier; Drupal issued a PSA on 20 October telling admins to update PHP. A Drupal security release does not carry a PHP engine fix. Advisory
PHP application. NCSC-NL's app-tier revision names Joomla 6.x Vulnerable runtime-scoped; Joomla 5 has the same PHP exposure, and extensions often ship their own bundled libraries.
PHP + Doctrine. Composer installs do not touch the interpreter.
PHP application on Flow.
PHP/Symfony CMS, often internet-facing for publishing workflows.
PHP/Symfony PIM/CMS; frequently integrated with ERP.
PHP/Symfony CMS.
PHP CMS with a long-lived 4.13 LTS line on PHP 7.4.
PHP/Yii application.
Laravel application; flat-file content does not remove the runtime.
Flat-file PHP CMS, popular on shared hosting.
Flat-file PHP CMS.
PHP CMS.
PHP CMS.
Laravel-based CMS.
Laravel-based fork of October.
PHP CMS, common in government and education.
PHP CMS.
PHP/Symfony CMS.
PHP CMS.
PHP CMS.
PHP CMS with a large French public-sector install base.
Flat-file PHP blog engine.
PHP blog engine.
PHP wiki.
Large PHP application with a wide attack surface of its own.
Flat-file PHP wiki, no database.
PHP application. NCSC-NL marks MediaWiki Vulnerable when the runtime is affected; Wikipedia runs a vendor-patched stack, self-hosted wikis do not inherit that.
Forums and communities8
PHP forum; one of the most widely deployed pieces of PHP on the internet.
PHP forum.
PHP community platform.
PHP forum, frequent target of mass exploitation.
PHP forum.
PHP/Laravel forum.
PHP community suite.
PHP forum (open-source edition).
Webmail and groupware16
PHP webmail, usually internet-facing. A runtime bug here is pre-auth mail access. NCSC-NL's 3b6535a revision marks Roundcube Webmail Vulnerable runtime-scoped; rebuild the image, not just the PHP package.
PHP webmail.
PHP webmail (maintenance mode upstream).
Legacy PHP webmail, still common on old mail servers.
PHP webmail and mail server front end.
PHP groupware suite.
PHP webapp on top of a C++ server.
Groupware with a PHP web client.
NCSC-NL lists Nextcloud Server Vulnerable, and the PHP runtime is bundled with the server package on many installs. Update the runtime as well as the app; AIO v14.4.1 is the fixed container path.
AIO v14.4.1 ships fixed PHP. Upgrade to it and verify the running version; older AIO images remain vulnerable even if the Nextcloud app is current. Advisory
PHP application, same exposure as Nextcloud when self-hosted.
The legacy PHP line; Pydio Cells is Go and not affected by this bug.
Self-hosted file sharing with a PHP web tier.
PHP groupware.
PHP groupware.
PHP collaboration suite.
Learning and libraries13
PHP LMS; frequently internet-facing for students.
Moodle derivative for enterprises.
PHP LMS, common in European universities.
PHP e-portfolio.
PHP LMS.
PHP LMS.
PHP LMS.
PHP scholarly publishing, usually public.
PHP publishing platform.
PHP preprint platform.
PHP library discovery layer.
PHP archival description system.
PHP digital collections platform.
Static site generators (the contrast case)6
This is the honest answer to "are we affected?" for a lot of marketing sites: a static build has no PHP interpreter, so the bug cannot reach it.
Go binary, no PHP. A static site has no runtime to exploit.
Ruby, no PHP at runtime.
Node.js build, static output.
Node.js build, static output.
Node.js build, static output.
Rust binary, static output.
Commerce, CRM and business applications82
Business applications are where exposure stops being embarrassing and starts being expensive: customer data, payment flows, and support portals that were deliberately published to the internet.
Commerce21
PHP/Zend-based. NCSC-NL marks Magento Open Source Vulnerable runtime-scoped, and Sansec demonstrated RCE on Magento 2.4.9. Patch the runtime; the payment and checkout paths are the target.
Magento fork, PHP.
Magento 1 fork, still widely deployed and on old PHP.
PHP commerce; 1.6 installs are still common and on 7.x runtimes.
PrestaShop fork, PHP.
PHP commerce.
PHP commerce, long-lived installs.
Legacy PHP commerce; often on ancient runtimes.
PHP commerce.
PHP commerce.
PHP commerce; 5.7 is the last line.
PHP/Symfony commerce.
PHP/Symfony commerce framework.
PHP commerce platform.
PHP/Symfony B2B commerce.
PHP commerce, strong in DACH.
PHP commerce, dominant in Japan.
PHP/Symfony commerce.
Laravel commerce.
Laravel commerce.
WordPress plugin. The plugin is not the runtime; the host's PHP is.
CRM, ERP and back office20
Confirmed PHP application, and the on-prem editions are frequently published to partners.
PHP CRM, the common Sugar fork.
PHP CRM.
PHP CRM.
PHP CRM.
PHP CRM for nonprofits, usually public-facing donation pages.
PHP marketing automation; tracking endpoints are public by design.
PHP ERP/CRM.
PHP HR management.
PHP accounting.
PHP ERP.
Laravel accounting.
Laravel invoicing; the client portal is public.
PHP invoicing.
PHP/Symfony invoicing.
PHP time tracking.
PHP project board.
PHP project management.
Python. Not affected as an application, but its web tier often fronts PHP integrations.
Python/JavaScript. No PHP runtime.
Helpdesk and support7
PHP helpdesk; the customer portal is internet-facing by design.
PHP helpdesk.
Laravel helpdesk.
Laravel helpdesk.
PHP/Symfony helpdesk.
Ruby on Rails. No PHP runtime.
Perl. No PHP runtime.
Hosting automation and billing7
PHP billing and provisioning. NCSC-NL marks WHMCS Vulnerable runtime-scoped; the client area is public and handles payment data.
PHP billing.
PHP billing.
PHP billing.
PHP billing.
PHP/Laravel game server panel.
Laravel billing panel.
Analytics, forms and feeds13
PHP analytics; the tracking endpoint is public by definition.
PHP analytics.
PHP surveys; public response forms.
PHP newsletter sender.
PHP mailing list manager.
PHP URL shortener.
PHP URL shortener.
PHP bookmarking. NCSC-NL now lists Shaarli as Vulnerable; update the package and the runtime.
PHP pastebin.
PHP file sharing for clients.
PHP feed reader.
PHP feed reader.
PHP read-later service.
ITSM, assets and identity10
PHP/php-fpm and frequently internet-facing for the self-service portal. GLPI says the core is not directly affected but the host PHP is; the official Docker images were rebuilt. Patch PHP first; a GLPI update does nothing for php2shell. Advisory
Vendor states the app is PHP. Patch the runtime in the OVA as well as the app.
PHP console plus Perl agent. The console holds a full asset database.
Laravel asset management; the asset database is the target.
PHP DCIM/IPAM.
PHP IPAM; the console maps the network for an attacker.
PHP/CakePHP password manager; the server holds the encrypted vault.
PHP password manager.
PHP GRC platform.
PHP bug tracker.
Health and research4
PHP EHR with a patient portal that is often published to the internet. Patch PHP; a portal patch does not close the runtime bug.
PHP research data capture, commonly internet-facing for multi-site studies.
Java. No PHP runtime.
Python. No PHP runtime.
Self-hosted operations and security tools57
Monitoring, backup and identity servers are the boxes administrators trust most and patch least. Most of them are PHP, and several are reachable from a VPN that is one hop from the internet.
Database and directory consoles4
PHP database console, frequently internet-facing. NCSC-NL's 3b6535a revision marks phpMyAdmin Vulnerable runtime-scoped; the console holds database credentials, so patch PHP and restrict access.
Single-file PHP database console. The file is the app; the runtime is the exposure.
PHP PostgreSQL console, often left on old hosting stacks.
PHP directory console; a runtime bug here exposes the directory service.
Monitoring28
If the product is .NET, Java, Go or Python, php2shell does not apply to it. That sounds obvious until you find a PHP console bolted onto the side of a Java appliance.
Vendor: PHP provides the web pages, and the OVA ships the OS PHP. Highest priority in this category.
PHP aggregation VM.
Same PHP UI family as XI; vendor does not publish the PHP version.
Same PHP UI family.
Vendor: the frontend is PHP. The 2026-10-20 appliance refresh predates the fix.
Vendor requires PHP 8.2+ for Icinga Web; the monitoring core is C++/Go.
PHP/Symfony central server, shipped as a VM image frozen at build time.
PHP console; vendor notes every PHP file is an entry point.
PHP status views and API in the CE/legacy line.
PHP + RRDtool appliance images.
PHP + RRDtool; a classic forgotten appliance.
PHP + RRDtool.
Vendor requirements list .NET only. No PHP in the request path.
Python/Werkzeug plus C/C++. No PHP.
ASP.NET on IIS.
Java/Tomcat.
Go/Python agent. Note that the PHP tracing extension must be rebuilt against the patched PHP ABI on hosts you upgrade.
Java.
Python/C++.
Java and Node.
Go. The PHP client SDKs are libraries, not the server.
C/Python/JavaScript.
Elastic, Suricata and Python tooling.
Java.
Java.
C and Go.
Go.
Node.js.
Backup and recovery13
PHP console in the 7.x to 9.x appliance line (recoveryconsole/bpl/*.php). Backup consoles are a top ransomware target.
PHP/Zend web UI on top of C daemons, often shipped as a VM image.
PHP reporting UI for Bacula.
ASP.NET/.NET on IIS, plus Go appliances in the cloud products. No PHP.
Java/Tomcat.
Go/Java/Scala.
Go/Java/Scala.
Java/Tomcat; Backup Exec is .NET.
.NET/Java console.
Java (Avamar, DP Series Manager) and C/Go (Data Domain).
Java Operations Center, C server.
Linux VA with a Java/JS console; no public PHP artefact either way.
Rust/Perl, no PHP.
Identity and access6
PHP SAML identity provider. Often the front door for every other application.
PHP LDAP management, see the ITSM branch.
Perl.
Java.
Python/Go.
Go.
Mail gateways6
MailScanner plus MailWatch, a PHP front end, packaged as an appliance.
PHP front end for MailScanner.
Vendor appliance, no PHP in the customer-facing path.
SaaS.
Appliance; check the firmware notes rather than assuming.
Fortinet appliance; FortiOS itself has no PHP, but the mail product line differs.
NAS, SAN and storage appliances39
Storage is where php2shell gets uncomfortable. A NAS is a small Linux server that happens to hold the backups, and several of them ship PHP for their web console whether or not you use it.
Prosumer and SMB NAS13
The QNAP row alone is the best argument for reading the firmware's PHP version rather than the product's marketing page: four branches, three different answers, one of which will never be fixed.
DSM itself is not PHP, but Web Station virtual hosts run PHP. Unpatched at publication; exposed only where a PHP virtual host is reachable.
Runs on DSM; the surveillance UI is not PHP, but the DSM package set may include Web Station.
Bundles PHP 8.2 and needs 8.2.35. Firmware update required.
Bundles PHP 7.4. A backport is the only path, and it is not guaranteed.
Bundles PHP 7.3, which will never be fixed upstream.
Bundles PHP 5.6. Permanently vulnerable; isolate the management interface.
App platform can install PHP applications. Check the installed packages.
App Central offers PHP apps. The base ADM UI is not PHP.
The web GUI itself is PHP, so the management plane is a PHP request path.
The web UI is PHP on nginx. Patch the host packages.
The webGUI is PHP. Unraid's update mechanism is the only supported patch path.
Middleware is Python and the UI is Angular. No PHP.
FreeBSD appliance with no PHP in the management path.
SMB and legacy NAS11
PHP console (upload.php, fb_publish.php). End of life and permanently vulnerable.
Ships libphp5.so. End of life.
Debian-based; check whether any installed app pulls PHP.
OS3 is end of life. Isolate it; it will not receive a PHP fix.
Check the firmware release notes for a PHP runtime.
Linux appliance; PHP is present on some firmware generations.
Legacy product; check the installed package list.
DroboAccess evidence weakened: CVE-2018-14699 names /DroboAccess/enable_user with no .php, so PHP presence is unverified. DroboApps can add PHP; the company is defunct, so any PHP it does run is permanent.
App modules can include PHP; base UI varies by firmware.
Check the firmware package list.
Discontinued line; no patch will arrive.
Enterprise storage and SAN15
Two enterprise storage arrays turned out to have PHP in the management plane, and one of them is on a runtime that will never be patched. This is why "it is a storage array" is not an answer.
NetApp documents PHP in System Manager and in ONTAP's error logging and RPC paths. The management interface is a PHP request path.
Apache 2.2 + mod_php 5.2.17 in the BUI. mod_php 5.2 is far past end of life, so the realistic action is network isolation and replacement planning.
Management plane is not PHP.
Java/HTML5 management, no PHP.
No PHP in the management path.
Purity is not PHP-based.
Java/Go management plane.
Embedded Linux with C/Perl services and a REST console.
The SMU web stack is not publicly documented; verify the firmware package list before closing the row.
No PHP in the management path.
Java management suite.
No public artefact either way; check the firmware package list.
Embedded Linux appliance; verify the management UI stack.
Verify the firmware package list.
Verify the management UI stack.
Firewalls, routers and network gear69
The network is where a compromised PHP console is worst: the box already has the routes, the VPN and often the credentials. Most network gear has no PHP, which makes the exceptions worth knowing.
Firewalls and routers29
pfSense and OPNsense are the two rows most people will find in their own rack, and neither had a fixed release at publication.
The webConfigurator is PHP. No fixed release at publication; the console is usually the management interface, not the WAN.
PHP console; 26.7.6 ships PHP 8.5.11. Update when the fixed image lands.
J-Web is enabled by default on EX. The PHP UI is the exposure, not Junos itself.
Optional jweb-srx-app package on 25.2 and later. If it is not installed, there is no path.
Legacy J-Web on MX; check whether the package is present.
httpsd is C plus Node. No PHP in the request path.
Ships confirmed PHP-FPM. This is the Fortinet exception.
Different appliance line from FortiGate; verify rather than generalising.
Palo Alto's product advisory covers PAN-OS 10.2-12.2 (all versions): affected, no fixed version ETA, CVSS 8.7 in their model, management plane exposed, GlobalProtect portal not affected. IPS signatures 543004 and 97622-97625 followed the 21 October advisory; Frontier Virtual Patching on 12.2.4+ had coverage before disclosure. Restrict management access to named admin hosts. Advisory
Palo Alto's advisory lists Panorama (all versions) affected with no fixed version ETA. The management interface is the exposure; restrict it and use the IPS signatures while waiting. Advisory
Apache plus a TCL CGI (ipstcl) portal; vendor documentation states it explicitly. The Mobile Access blade is a separate PHP exception (next row).
Ships PHP under $CVPNDIR/phpincs: the R81 Mobile Access Administration Guide tells admins to edit MDMVendors.php and add PHP functions. Internet-facing remote-access path; no php2shell advisory or applicability statement from Check Point as of 21 October.
SonicOS management is a C httpd plus JavaScript. No PHP artefact.
Separate Linux appliance from the firewall line. NVD has 31 CVE records and zero PHP mentions, but that is E3, not a firmware census; check the portal on-box. No php2shell PSIRT advisory as of 21 October.
NVD has 499 CVE records and zero PHP mentions; the interfaces are CGI and Java. E3, not a firmware census: run find / -name '*.php' if you have a support shell.
WebAdmin is Apache plus Tomcat (Java). No PHP. Sophos's advisory says no products are affected, but its legacy MyUTM hosted licensing portal ran affected PHP and was taken offline; review logs from 1 August and do not treat a product clearance as a service clearance. Advisory
Apache plus Perl CGI. No PHP in the product. MyUTM, the legacy hosted licensing service for end-of-life SG UTM, ran affected PHP and was taken offline on 21 October; Sophos found no evidence of exploitation. Review logs from 1 August. Advisory
WGSA-2026-0032 (21 October, 19:51 UTC): initial assessment is that none of WatchGuard's products are affected; the advisory is under review. Advisory detail pages live on psirt.watchguard.com, not the www. index. Fireware has unrelated CVEs worth tracking separately. Advisory
Apache plus C CGI with a custom auth module. No PHP found.
No PHP runtime in RouterOS.
Verify the management UI.
Verify the management UI.
Verify the management UI.
No PHP runtime.
No PHP runtime.
Admin portal is Java; verify any bundled reporting components before closing the row.
Java management suite; verify bundled components.
Java/Go management plane.
Cloud-managed; no customer PHP runtime.
Switching and wireless25
Two rules hold across this branch. First, a firewall vendor's flagship being clear says nothing about its ADC or management appliance. Second, "J-Web" is a PHP application bolted onto a non-PHP operating system.
PHP web UI. The 1.9 line is end of life and permanently vulnerable.
The advisory named 1.9.6 and older. Do not assume newer is patched; verify.
Java/Go/Node behind nginx. No PHP.
No PHP.
Ran nginx to php5-fpm. End of life and permanently vulnerable.
Embedded C web UI.
PHP services and Smarty templates; guest and sponsor portals are .php. Often internet-facing.
No PHP in the switch management plane.
Cloud management.
No PHP.
Junos itself is not PHP. J-Web is a separate package and is listed above.
No PHP.
No PHP.
Legacy controller UI; verify the stack.
APM page templates and the TMOS platform ship PHP. Exposed when APM or the management interface is published; applicability to php2shell is not established. F5 had no PSIRT advisory as of 21 October, only a community thread.
Separate management appliance from BIG-IP; the web stack is undocumented. Check it on-box before closing the row.
Firmware analysis of NetScaler 14.1-73.46: PHP 8.1.34, unpatched, exposed on the management GUI on port 80 (mod_php); the Gateway and AAA data plane set php_flag engine off and deny .php. Restrict NSIP/SNIP/cluster-IP management access; no Citrix advisory or fix date as of 21 October. Advisory
DesktopDirect runs from /ca/aproxy/webapp/, a PHP-executing directory; attackers dropped PHP webshells there (CVE-2025-66644, CISA KEV). Fixed in ArrayOS AG 9.4.5.9; disable DesktopDirect if unused. Advisory
The SSL-VPN portal is PHP: /svpn_html/loadfile.php and LogInOut.php; an arbitrary file read was published. Patch the runtime and restrict the portal.
The /report/ subsystem is PHP (download.php); the management login is /rep/login. Restrict both paths and patch the runtime.
Apache plus a PHP management framework (/webconf/, local_user.php, PHPSESSID_NF). The WAF model is unverified; treat the management plane as PHP.
ACOS uses a10wa, its own embedded C web server, with a C handler under /xml/downloads/. No PHP in the ACOS 7.0.3 documentation.
The management stacks are undocumented; an on-box check is the only closure. This is one of the highest-value remaining unknowns in the network branch.
Tomcat/JSP and DWR console plus Python CGI for PWS; no PHP.
The WUI is a C daemon for the /accessv2 JSON API plus bash CGI scripts in /usr/wui/progs; no PHP.
Routing software, DNS and proxies15
LuCI is Lua; the base image has no PHP. The optional php8 package is the exception.
The php8 feed ships 8.2.29 / 8.3.32 / 8.4.21 on supported lines, all below the fix. Only relevant if php8-* is installed; upgrade with opkg (apk on 25.12+).
No PHP.
No PHP.
The v5 admin console is PHP. If you are still on v5, patch or move to v6.
Rewritten console with an embedded web server, no PHP.
Go.
C, no PHP.
C, no PHP. It may proxy to php-fpm, which is the part that needs patching.
C.
Go.
Python/Django.
Ruby.
Perl.
.NET.
Enterprise appliances and software28
Enterprise software is mostly Java, .NET or Go, which is why the PHP exceptions matter: they hide inside product lines that security teams have already classified as "the vendor patches it".
Security and operations appliances6
IBM's own bulletin describes QRadar as vulnerable to PHP object injection; the console is PHP.
Forensics is a PHP web application.
Confirmed PHP in the product; the management server is the exposure.
Confirmed PHP in the central management console.
PHP web application for print management; often published to all staff.
PHP front end for the CSA management and VPN portal; CVE-2021-44529 and CVE-2024-8190 chains run through it. End of life and internet-facing: replace, do not patch. Advisory
Enterprise software (no PHP)22
This branch exists to be boring. The useful part is the two rows above it, where an enterprise vendor put PHP in a management appliance and then had to say so.
ABAP/Java. No PHP in the application server.
Java/Forms.
SaaS.
SaaS; no on-prem appliance.
Java. Data Center is customer-hosted but not PHP.
.NET.
.NET/C++.
Java/Go and C. No PHP.
Java/Go.
SaaS.
Proprietary/Caché, not PHP.
Java/C++.
SaaS.
Scala/Java/Go.
Java.
C++/Java/Go.
.NET.
Java Mid-Tier.
Java/.NET. This row does not cover the CSA appliance above, which is PHP.
Java.
Java/.NET.
OSSIM-era UI included PHP; the current USM appliance is not publicly documented. Verify on-box.
Printers, MFPs and print servers24
Printers are the classic forgotten PHP host: an embedded Linux box, a web console nobody updates, and a scan-to-email path that reaches the internal network.
Multifunction printers17
Two vendor families, Xerox WorkCentre and EFI Fiery, are the ones with actual PHP artefacts. Everything else in this table is a checked absence, not a guess.
Confirmed PHP in the remote UI (configrui.php), with a history of pre-auth bugs (CVE-2016-11061, CVE-2018-20768).
ConnectKey generation; check the firmware web stack before closing.
ConnectKey generation; same check.
Print server software; check the bundled web components.
WebTools exposes PHP and version strings at /get_version.php; PHP 7.4.12 was observed in the wild.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
Verify the web console stack.
Print management software7
Java. No PHP.
Verify the web component stack.
Verify the web component stack.
Cloud-managed print; verify the on-premises connector.
Verify the server component stack.
C, no PHP.
Embedded C print server.
Telephony and VoIP34
A PBX is a Linux server with a public SIP port and, very often, a PHP web GUI. FreePBX alone is enough to make this branch worth checking.
PBX distributions14
If the PBX is reachable from the internet for softphones or remote agents, the PHP console is reachable too. That is the whole exposure model.
The GUI is PHP on the distro runtime. Public exposure is common for remote extensions.
PHP GUI, older distro base.
End of life line on PHP 5.6/7.4; no realistic patch path.
Commercial FreePBX appliance, same PHP GUI.
PHP PBX distribution, fork of Elastix.
Discontinued; the 2.x/4.x line is on old PHP.
PHP management GUI on an Asterisk base.
PHP GUI on Asterisk.
FreePBX on Raspberry Pi; image date decides the PHP version.
PHP GUI on FreeSWITCH.
PHP management GUI.
PHP admin and agent screens; often internet-facing for remote agents.
PHP billing for Asterisk.
PHP administration GUI.
Fax and unified messaging6
Fax servers are web-facing by design (web-to-fax portals) and almost never in the patch cycle. Four PHP front ends, one of them end-of-service with a pre-auth SYSTEM RCE.
Windows Server plus Apache 2.4 and PHP 8.1.31 on port 8090 (C:/F2MAdmin/F2E: agent.php, TestFax.php, ajaxBackupUploadFile.php). End of Service 2024-12-31; CVE-2025-34328 and CVE-2025-34329 give unauthenticated RCE as SYSTEM. Block 8090 and hunt webshells. Advisory
Apache mod_php, 214 .php scripts and Smarty; faxrcvd.php and notify.php are on the inbound path. Public portals have been seen on PHP 5.4.16 and 8.0.30; update and move to a supported PHP.
Same PHP lineage (sendfax.php); 0.2.5 plus the 2025 file-inclusion fix. Patch the web front end and the PHP runtime.
3.7 is Drupal 7 (173 .php); 4.x is an Angular SPA over the PHP ICTCore backend (153 .php). Upgrade and confirm the ICTCore PHP build.
C++ daemons with no HTTP server or web UI; the exposure is whichever web front end is bolted on.
.NET/IIS or embedded C; no PHP in the fax path. Patch for their own CVEs.
VoIP infrastructure (no PHP)14
C. The PHP exposure is in the GUI distributions above, not the engine.
C.
C.
C.
C.
Go/JS.
.NET; no PHP.
Proprietary appliance.
Verify the web management component stack.
Verify the web management component stack.
Verify the web management component stack.
Embedded PBX; verify the web GUI stack.
Embedded PBX; verify the web GUI stack.
PHP web GUI on a C capture engine.
Cameras, access control, IoT and consumer devices80
Consumer devices are mostly single-purpose firmware with no PHP, which is why the exceptions read like a list of small Linux servers wearing a plastic shell. Access control is the opposite problem: the vendors rarely document the web tier, so the closed rows are closed with SBOMs and service configs rather than guesses.
Cameras and surveillance software29
A camera with a PHP web UI is a small web server on the camera VLAN. The models that have one are worth naming, and the ones that do not are worth writing down so the next audit is shorter.
PHP console with a public camera-view path. Often published for remote viewing.
Verify the web component stack.
Node.js.
Python/Go.
Python.
Verify the web component stack.
Runs on QTS; the QTS branch determines the PHP exposure.
Go/Node.
Embedded C: /ISAPI/ and /cgi-bin/ handlers over an HTML/JS UI. No PHP found.
C CGI handlers. No PHP found.
Embedded C/Go web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
No PHP in the web UI.
Verify the web UI stack.
No PHP in the web UI.
Dahua-derived firmware with no PHP.
No PHP in the web UI.
Dahua-derived firmware with no PHP.
No PHP in the web UI.
Verify the web UI stack.
Embedded C web UI.
Verify the web UI stack.
Verify the web UI stack.
No PHP in the management plane.
.NET.
.NET.
C++/Qt.
No PHP in the management plane.
Access control and building systems11
Eight access-control rows that were open questions are now closed with vendor evidence: SBOMs, service configs and endpoint sets, not guesses. Paxton10, Brivo and Integriti Web stay Verify because their stacks are not public.
Apache 2.4.57 fronting ASP.NET Core 8 (Kestrel), React, Node-RED and PostgreSQL. The vendor CycloneDX SBOM lists 898 components and zero PHP.
Proprietary form dispatch (/goforms/nbapi), not a script router; the 47-page hardening guide and the NBAPI docs contain no PHP.
nginx to a Tomcat/JVM webapp, a C++ server and MariaDB; the JVM is patched at JAR level. No PHP.
Tomcat + JSP + Struts2 (visLogin.jsp, authLoginAction!login.do). No PHP.
Windows service plus SQL Server and a .NET client; the documentation index has no PHP.
Embedded C#/.NET UI; the string table has no PHP.
C# CompactWebServer, SQLite and a SOAP API; the vendor advisory names the web server.
Windows application server plus MSSQL; no PHP in the web tier.
The appliance stack is not documented; the firmware is a rootfs.tar.gz, so a PHP tier is plausible. Check it on-box.
Console-managed appliance; the web stack is undocumented. Check it on-box.
The .NET catalogue covers Integriti, but this web tier is undocumented. Check it on-box.
Media players and smart TVs21
No PHP in the player firmware.
No PHP.
No PHP.
No PHP.
No PHP.
Embedded C.
Perl.
.NET/Mono.
Node.js.
PHP web UI on a Raspberry Pi audio appliance. Patch the host packages.
PHP backend for the web UI; the project is dormant.
No PHP.
No PHP.
No PHP.
No PHP.
No PHP.
BrightScript, no PHP.
Android-based, no PHP.
tvOS, no PHP.
Cast platform, no PHP.
Android TV, no PHP.
Home automation11
Python.
Java.
C++.
Verify the management UI stack.
No PHP.
Node.js.
Node.js.
Perl.
Embedded firmware, no PHP.
No PHP.
No PHP.
Consumer routers8
Embedded C web UI.
Embedded C web UI.
Embedded C web UI.
Embedded C web UI.
Some models bundle PHP for add-on applications; verify the model.
No PHP.
No PHP.
No PHP.
Industrial, OT and building systems27
Operational technology is the branch where the honest answer is usually "we could not verify". Two vendors have confirmed PHP in their web management; the rest are marked accordingly.
PLC, HMI and gateway web servers17
The WAGO and Contec rows are why this branch exists. Everything else is a checked absence or an honest "unverified", not a claim that OT is safe.
The Web-Based Management is PHP on lighttpd and FastCGI (php-cgi confirmed through firmware 03.02.02). Later WBM builds are unverified.
Confirmed PHP in the HMI web interface.
Verify the panel's web server stack; Siemens does not publish it as PHP.
Embedded web server, no PHP.
Verify the panel's web server stack.
Windows-based, no PHP in the ADS/web surface.
Linux-based; verify installed packages.
Serial device server; verify the web UI stack.
SCADA/HMI web platform; verify the installed components.
Java.
.NET/Java.
Windows/.NET.
.NET.
.NET.
IEC 61131 runtime, no PHP.
Gateway web UI; verify the firmware stack.
Industrial switch management; verify the firmware stack.
Building automation5
Verify the web management stack.
Niagara Framework is Java; verify any PHP add-on.
Verify the web management stack.
Verify the web management stack.
Gateway firmware varies by vendor; verify each model.
Medical devices5
Vendor-managed appliance; verify the web component stack.
Vendor-managed appliance; verify the web component stack.
Vendor-managed appliance; verify the web component stack.
Vendor-managed; verify with the vendor rather than scanning.
Vendor-managed; verify with the vendor.
Developer tooling and SDKs (caller-side)43
This branch exists to stop a specific mistake: treating a PHP library, framework or SDK as the thing to patch. They all run on the interpreter, so the interpreter is the fix.
Package and test tooling15
A PHAR that runs on PHP. Updating Composer does not change the interpreter it runs on.
Package index; it distributes code, it does not run your site.
Test runner; same rule.
Static analysis; same rule.
Static analysis; same rule.
Refactoring tool.
Code style tool.
A Zend extension. It must be rebuilt against the patched PHP ABI, but it is not the bug.
Coverage extension; rebuild after the PHP upgrade.
Profiler agent; rebuild the extension.
Profiler extension; rebuild it.
Native extension; rebuild it against the patched ABI.
Native extension; rebuild it.
Library, not a runtime.
Library and extension.
Frameworks8
Framework. Its security releases do not patch the engine. NCSC-NL marks Laravel 13 Vulnerable in the runtime-scoped app tier; an app built on it is exposed through PHP, not through the framework code.
Framework. NCSC-NL marks Symfony Vulnerable in the runtime-scoped app tier; the framework is caller-side, the runtime is the assessed element.
Framework.
Framework.
Framework.
Framework (Zend successor).
Micro-framework.
C extension framework; rebuild it against the patched PHP.
Cloud and payment SDKs7
Library. The runtime that executes it is the exposure.
Library.
Library.
Library.
Library.
HTTP client library.
Logging library.
Other language runtimes8
Not PHP. A Node service has no php2shell surface.
Not PHP.
Not PHP.
Not PHP.
Not PHP.
Not PHP.
Not PHP.
Not PHP. A CGI wrapper that executes PHP would still be in scope.
Engines that are not the PHP engine5
These are the "PHP-compatible" engines. Being written in something other than C is exactly why php2shell does not apply to them.
A separate JIT runtime for Hack; it does not embed the PHP C engine.
.NET compiler for PHP; not the vulnerable C runtime.
PHP implemented on the JVM; not the vulnerable C runtime.
PHP on the JVM; not the vulnerable C runtime.
PHP-to-C++ compiler; not the vulnerable runtime at request time.
Data-centre hardware with no PHP in the management path27
These are the rows that keep an audit honest. Each one was checked and found not to run PHP, so the answer is "no action" rather than "unknown".
Server management controllers7
Firmware-verified: the iDRAC9 7.20.30.50 rootfs has no php, php.ini, .php, libphp or mod_php. The web tier is Apache plus C/C++ FastCGI.
CMC shares the iDRAC firmware family; OME is Java. No PHP.
Embedded C web server plus Redfish. No PHP found in firmware docs or CVEs.
Java management appliance.
Embedded C web UI.
Embedded C web UI.
Embedded management, no PHP.
Server switches6
Static HTML plus C CGI. The 27 bare "PHP" string hits in the firmware are MPLS Penultimate Hop Popping, not an interpreter.
Zero PHP packages.
Legacy line; verify the firmware before closing.
No PHP in the switch management plane.
Fabric OS, no PHP.
NX-OS, no PHP.
Power, KVM and tape9
Embedded appliance; APC does not publish the stack. Verify on-box before closing.
Verify the card firmware stack.
Verify the management card stack.
Verify the KVM management stack.
Verify the KVM management stack.
No public PHP artefact either way; library consoles are rarely internet-facing.
No PHP in the management path.
Verify the library console stack.
C/Go management, no PHP.
Hypervisors and cloud infrastructure5
Perl/ExtJS management, no PHP.
Xen/C management, no PHP.
Python.
Java.
Go.
How to read this. Vulnerable means the vendor confirmed it, or the product is on a branch with no fixed build available. Likely means PHP is in the request path and the shipped build is below the fix floor. No fix means end of life or the vendor has said no patch is coming. PHP app means the product is written in PHP and inherits whatever runtime it sits on, so its own version is not a control. NCSC-NL's runtime-scoped VEX marks ten applications Vulnerable when they sit on an affected PHP runtime; the application rows stay under PHP app and the Laravel and Symfony frameworks stay under Caller-side here because the assessed element is the runtime. Patched means a fixed build is published. No PHP means the management path was checked and has no interpreter.
Two traps. A bare PHP string in firmware is usually MPLS Penultimate Hop Popping, and Linux appliances also ship php.nanorc and manual pages. Only php-fpm, php-cgi, php.ini, libphp, mod_php, session.upload_progress, a .php file in a web root, or a PHP package in the distro database counts. And a vendor that has not published a statement has not said it is safe.
Vendor links go to the product page; Advisory links go to the primary source. This table is a starting point for verification, not a substitute for it. Check the manufacturer's or project's own page before you act: this is a fast-moving incident and these grades will go stale.
A note on the cleared rows: they are the most useful part of an audit, because “we checked and there is no PHP here” closes a question. The ones marked Verify are not cleared. A vendor that has not published a statement has not said it is safe; it has only failed to say anything.
Check what you are actually running
The first job is to find every PHP SAPI in the request path, not every application that happens to be written in PHP.
On a Linux host you control:
php -v
php-fpm -v 2>/dev/null || php-fpm8.4 -v 2>/dev/null
ps aux | grep -E 'php-fpm|php-cgi|httpd|apache2|lsws' | grep -v grep
Then confirm which configuration the running workers actually loaded, because a patched CLI binary and an unpatched FPM pool can coexist on the same machine:
php -i | grep -E 'Server API|Loaded Configuration|PHP Version'
For packages, ask the package manager rather than the binary:
dpkg -l | grep -E '^ii\s+(php|libapache2-mod-php)' | awk '{print $2, $3}'
rpm -qa | grep -E '^php' | sort
apk info -v 2>/dev/null | grep '^php'
For an appliance you can shell into, or a container image you have not started yet, the same three questions apply. Ask the image, then ask the filesystem:
docker run --rm --entrypoint php <image> -v
ps w | grep -E 'php-fpm|php-cgi|lighttpd|nginx'
find / -xdev \( -name 'php.ini' -o -name 'libphp*.so' -o -name 'php-fpm*' \) 2>/dev/null
If the firmware cannot be extracted, binwalk plus strings for php-fpm, php-cgi and php.ini is the next step. A vendor GPL source-offer page that publishes a php-8.x tarball is also proof, and it is often easier to find than a package list.
For a remote host, the headers are weak evidence but useful triage:
curl -sI https://example.com/ | grep -iE 'server|x-powered-by'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' https://example.com/index.php
A 200 on a .php path tells you a PHP SAPI is likely there. It does not tell you the version, the branch, or the patch level. For appliances, the only reliable answers are the vendor’s advisory and the firmware package list; for a container, it is the image digest and build date.
Finally, check what is actually serving the application, not what the deployment tool says:
systemctl list-units --type=service | grep -E 'php|httpd|apache|lsws'
docker ps --format '{{.Names}}\t{{.Image}}'
If you find a PHP-FPM pool, you have found the thing that has to be at or above the floor, and the thing that has to be restarted afterwards.
Mitigate while you patch
CERT-EU’s advisory lists temporary mitigations. They are worth applying within the hour if patching will take longer than that, but none of them is a substitute for the patched engine.
Disable the memory limit for the affected pool. The first bug needs the memory_limit unwind path. Setting memory_limit=-1 through php_admin_value removes that path. It also removes your protection against a runaway request, so pair it with a hard container or cgroup limit. The cgroup limit is enforced by the kernel; RLIMIT_AS and RLIMIT_DATA are not a substitute for it.
Cap the request body. Lower post_max_size to something small (8M or 32M), and set upload_max_filesize below it. A smaller body gives the parser less room to reach the interesting state. This will break large uploads. That is the trade.
Cap what your proxy will accept. Decoded body size, number of multipart fields, header count and nesting depth should all have limits at the reverse proxy or load balancer. This is useful against the upload path even when you cannot change PHP yet.
Turn off upload progress. session.upload_progress.enabled=0 removes one of the request shapes that reaches the vulnerable state. Restart the workers after changing it.
Turn off fatal error backtraces on 8.5. fatal_error_backtraces=0 reduces the amount of state the engine keeps around after a fatal error, which is the second bug’s territory.
Restart every worker. This is the step people skip. PHP-FPM, mod_php, LiteSpeed and FrankenPHP keep the old binary in memory until the master or the process is restarted. A package upgrade with no restart leaves the vulnerable code running.
Use the WAF rules as a stopgap, not a fix. Cloudflare, Akamai and Imperva shipped emergency signatures. They are useful while you patch, and they are trivially defeated by changing the request shape if the attacker is not a commodity scanner. They do not change the engine.
Take the management interface off the internet. A firewall GUI, a NAS admin page, a Plesk panel or an IPMI console that is not reachable is not exploitable over HTTP. This is the only control that works for a device on a branch that will never be fixed.
Vendor pages that change the decision
The first pass said most vendors were silent. That was true at 19:30 UTC and false by the time this update was published. These are the statements that change an operational decision.
- Palo Alto Networks: PAN-OS 10.2, 11.1, 11.2, 12.1 and 12.2 (all versions) and Panorama (all versions) are affected, with no fixed version and no ETA. Their product-specific score is 8.7, not 9.2, because they model the impact as availability-only inside the appliance. The management interface is the exposure; GlobalProtect is not. IPS signatures 543004 and 97622-97625 are available, and Frontier Virtual Patching on 12.2.4+ had coverage before disclosure. Restrict management to named admin hosts.
- Microsoft and Google: Azure Front Door rule 99006001 is disabled by default, rolls out to 28 October and only blocks when the action is set to Block on anomaly; App Gateway has a header-rewrite workaround, not a managed rule. Google’s GCP-2026-070 says App Engine and Cloud Run are auto-patched only when automatic updates are enabled; a pinned image is not covered. Upgrade the runtime.
- cPanel and Plesk: cPanel’s EasyApache 4 backports now cover 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1 as well as 8.2-8.5; verify with
rpm -q --changelog, notphp -v. Plesk patched 8.2-8.5 and rebuilt 7.4, 8.0 and 8.1 with the same version numbers but a 21 October build date. Plesk’s ownsw-engineis still unpatched until hotfix 18.0.80#11 / 18.0.81#4; restrict or stopsw-cp-serveruntil then. - CloudLinux and TuxCare: fixed alt-php packages are shipping across CloudLinux 6/7, AlmaLinux 8-10, Ubuntu 16.04-26.04 and Debian 10-13, including 5.2 and 5.6 on the branches that support them; 8.5 was scheduled for around 22:30 UTC. TuxCare covers RHEL 7, Oracle Linux 6/7, CentOS 8.4/8.5 and Stream 8, Amazon Linux 2, AlmaLinux 9.2/9.8 ESU, TuxCare 9.6/9.8, Ubuntu 16.04-20.04 and Alpine 3.18. The trap: the OVAL/VEX metadata is not published yet, so
yum --securityanddnf updateinfowill not list them. Useyum update alt-php*. - Hosting providers: GoDaddy says managed WordPress is patched, but shared Web/Windows hosting is mitigated and waiting on vendor packages; ask whether the runtime is patched. SiteGround disabled the affected functionality before release, which is a feature-level mitigation, not a confirmed runtime patch. Automattic says WordPress.com, VIP, WP Cloud, Pressable and Tumblr are protected. Heroku rebuilt PHP 8.1.34 and requires a redeploy. Laravel Forge says its automatic updates do not patch PHP.
- Appliance and security vendors: WatchGuard’s WGSA-2026-0032 says none of its products are affected, under review. Sophos says no products are affected, but its legacy MyUTM hosted licensing portal ran affected PHP and was taken offline; review logs from 1 August. Citrix NetScaler’s firmware analysis finds PHP 8.1.34 unpatched in the management GUI, while the Gateway and AAA data plane have PHP off. Red Hat rates the CVE Important rather than Critical, citing FPM’s early-exit behaviour; that is a vendor risk position, not a reason to leave mod_php exposed.
- WAFs are still not the fix: Vercel received advance notice and deployed rules, but says direct-to-origin requests bypass its edge. Fastly says mitigation may block a substantial portion of legitimate traffic. Azure’s rule is off by default. None of these changes the engine.
What is not affected, and the myths worth killing
“We do not run PHP.” You may not run a PHP application. That is a different statement. Synology Web Station, a QNAP firmware package, a printer web console, a monitoring appliance and a vendor container image can all put a PHP SAPI in the request path without anybody installing WordPress. The tree below is organised around that distinction.
“We patched WordPress.” NCSC-NL now marks WordPress Vulnerable in a runtime-scoped model, which is a statement about the PHP runtime underneath it, not about WordPress core. WordPress’s own advisory says update PHP; a WordPress update does not carry a PHP engine fix.
“We are behind a WAF.” The WAF may block the commodity exploit. It does not patch the interpreter, and it does not help against a request shaped to avoid the signature. Azure Front Door’s php2shell rule is disabled by default and only acts when set to Block on anomaly; Vercel’s coverage stops at its edge and direct-to-origin requests are not covered; Fastly warns mitigation may block legitimate traffic.
“PHP 7.4 is end of life, so nobody targets it.” End of life means no upstream fix will come, not that the bug is absent. An EOL branch with no vendor backport is a permanent exposure with a public exploit. Check the backport before you conclude it is permanent.
“Our switch has the string PHP in its firmware, so it is affected.” Almost certainly not. A bare PHP string is usually MPLS Penultimate Hop Popping, and Linux appliances also ship php.nanorc and manual pages. Dell’s OS6 firmware has 27 bare PHP hits and no interpreter at all. Only php-fpm, php-cgi, php.ini, libphp, mod_php, session.upload_progress, a .php file in a web root, or a PHP package in the distro database counts.
“Our vendor has not published an advisory, so we are not affected.” Silence is latency. It is not a statement of safety, and the vendor may not know yet. Conversely, “none of our products are affected” is not “none of our services were affected”: Sophos’s products are clear, but its legacy MyUTM portal ran affected PHP and was taken offline.
“The vendor will patch the appliance.” Not on any schedule you can rely on. PAN-OS has no fixed version or ETA, Plesk’s panel is waiting on a hotfix, and NetScaler has no Citrix advisory or fix date. Restrict the management interface now.
“It needs authentication.” It does not. It needs a request that reaches the PHP SAPI.
“It is only exploitable if the application accepts uploads.” The body parser runs before the application decides anything. Whether your code wanted a file is not the gate.
“We are on 8.5, so we are fine.” 8.5.12 is the floor. The branch number is not the version.
“Static sites are affected too.” A static site has no PHP interpreter at runtime. A build server that runs PHP to generate the site is a different machine, and that machine needs patching.
The 70% number, and what it actually measures
Wiz’s write-up carries the headline claim that php2shell affects 70% of the internet. That figure comes from PHP’s share of websites. It is a measure of reach, not a measurement of exploitable hosts: a site can use PHP and still be patched, behind a fixed runtime, or not exposing a PHP SAPI at all.
The number is still useful for one purpose. It explains why this disclosure produced emergency WAF rules, national CERT alerts and headlines about taking sites offline. The population that could be affected is enormous. The population that is exploitable is the subset running an unpatched SAPI, and that is the subset you can actually enumerate.
What to do, in order
- Inventory the SAPIs, not the applications. Web servers, FPM pools, CGI, LiteSpeed, FrankenPHP, containers, appliances, panels. If a device has a management page and you do not know what serves it, that is a task.
- Patch the runtime to the branch floor. Use the distribution package where one exists. If you are on 7.4, 8.0 or 8.1, apply the source backport your vendor ships or rebuild. On cPanel and Plesk the version number may not change; on CloudLinux and TuxCare the security metadata may lag. Verify the package changelog or build date, not
php -v. If you are on 7.3 or older, ask your support channel for a backport (Ubuntu ESM, TuxCare and CloudLinux have shipped them), and plan replacement and isolation if there is none. - Restrict the management plane while you wait. PAN-OS and Panorama have no fixed build, Plesk’s own panel is waiting on a hotfix, and NetScaler’s management GUI is the exposed path. Put those interfaces behind a jump host or an ACL now.
- Restart every worker. Confirm with
php -vand with the process start time, not with the package version alone. - Verify from outside. Re-check the headers and the
.phppath, and confirm the patched binary is the one the service loaded. - Hunt for the pre-patch window. Look for PHP fatal errors about memory exhaustion around upload requests, unexpected worker restarts, and segfaults in
php-fpm. These are generic signals, not proof, but they are the right place to start. - Rotate what the workers could see. Memory disclosure means credentials, session tokens and API keys may have left the process before you patched. Patching stops the bleeding; it does not undo the read.
- Re-check the appliances you do not manage. The tree below is the short list. Ask hosting vendors for the PHP runtime version and WAF vendors for the rule coverage, not the marketing claim. Vendor silence is a task, not a verdict.
The uncomfortable summary is that this is a runtime bug with a runtime fix. Everything else, the CMS patch, the WAF rule, the framework update, the vendor’s assurance that the application is not PHP, is either a stopgap or a category error.
Sources
- GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w: RCE via OOM corruption
- GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp: RCE via stale global state
- PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35 release archive
- CERT-EU security advisory 2026-018
- CERT-FR alert CERTFR-2026-ALE-014
- BSI cyber security warning 2026-297981-1032
- CERT Polska advisory 196/2026
- NCSC-NL operational information repository
- Ubuntu USN-8948-1
- Debian DSA-6574-1
- Debian DLA-4848-1
- Red Hat RHSA-2026:87072
- SUSE CVE-2026-109618 tracking page
- NVD: CVE-2025-34328, AudioCodes Fax Server
- NVD: CVE-2025-66644, Array Networks DesktopDirect
- Cloudflare: WAF protection for the PHP vulnerabilities
- Sansec research: php2shell
- JFrog research: what you need to know
- Palo Alto Unit 42 threat brief
- Wiz: php2shell
- Calif.io: php2shell
- NCSC-NL and CERT-EU downstream inventory
- The Next Web: PHP knew about one flaw in 2024
- Ubuntu: php2shell fixes available, with ESM versions
- USN-8948-2
- NSA advisory: PHP updates
- NCSC UK: critical security issue affecting PHP
- BBC: websites taken down worldwide
- Reuters: government websites go dark
- watchTowr: PHP RCE FAQ
- Wikimedia Diff: impact on Wikimedia tools and services
- Wikipedia: PHP2Shell
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue
- WordPress: Critical PHP Security Release
- Drupal PSA-2026-10-20
- Precursor Security: confirmed PHP2Shell demonstrations
- Palo Alto Networks: CVE-2026-109618 product advisory
- Microsoft: Azure WAF mitigations for php2shell
- Google Cloud bulletin GCP-2026-070
- cPanel: Critical PHP Security Release
- Plesk: CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619
- Nextcloud AIO issue 8876
- Heroku changelog 3845
- Laravel Forge: PHP security release
- GLPI security advisory
- Automattic: your sites are protected
- Sophos: php2shell advisory
- WatchGuard: WGSA-2026-0032
- GoDaddy: PHP security update
- SiteGround: critical PHP vulnerabilities
- Vercel: php2shell security bulletin
- Fastly: proactive protection for the PHP RCEs
- CloudLinux status: PHP CVE releases
- Red Hat: CVE-2026-109618
- Remko Weijnen: NetScaler firmware analysis
- SentinelOne: stopping PHP2Shell
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